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ABSTRACT 
Notwithstanding  substantial federal financial support for the export promotion of agricultural products, ways to
improve the efficiency of federal funding have not been discussed in empirical research. In this study, an
equilibrium displacement framework was developed to evaluate whether the efficiency of export promotion
expenditures could be increased by linking them with changes in the exchange rate.  In our analysis, the gross gain
to domestic cotton producers from the exchange-rate linked subsidy scheme was positive.   Findings support 
exchange-rate linked subsidies for export promotion of agricultural products. [Econ-lit citations: Q 11,Q 13]
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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) supports a number of export promotion
programs to strengthen the market position of US agricultural commodities in international markets.
In 2001, the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP) and the Market Assistance Program4
(MAP) funding for export promotion was over $130 million (USDA, 2001). Research on export
promotion has demonstrated the positive and significant impacts of export promotion programs in
strengthening the market position of various US agricultural commodities in international markets
(Le et al.,1997; Comeau et al., 1997; Halliburton and Henneberry,1995; Onunknwo and Epperson,
2000; Fuller et al., 1992; Lee et al.,1979; Solomon and Kinnucan, 1991).  Notwithstanding the
significant role of federal promotion programs, no previous research addresses the efficiency of
federal allocations to further expand the marketing opportunities for US agricultural products.  The
issue of efficiency of each dollar invested in export promotion has emerged as a serious concern
among policy makers because of the growing strength of the US dollar in export markets and the
weakening position of some of US agricultural commodities in international markets.  It is also
supported by the trend of decreasing federal funding for agricultural export promotion.  
In general, a stronger dollar makes US goods more expensive and promotes the entry of
competitors in international markets. Concurrently, a strong dollar makes import goods cheaper in
domestic markets.  Realizing the negative impacts of strong US dollars on US agricultural products
in international markets, It has been proposed that federal subsidies for export promotion of US
agricultural commodities be linked to the exchange rate in order to increase its efficiency (Armbruster
and Nichols, 2001).  It was argued that exchange rate-linked subsidies could blunt the effect of
adverse movements in the exchange rate on farm prices and increase the efficiency of export
promotion subsidy schemes.
USDA economists have estimated that exchange rate fluctuation accounts for 25 % of the
change in the value of US exports.  By increasing federal subsidies for export promotion when the
dollar is strong, and by reducing it when the dollar is weak, it might be possible to enhance the5
effectiveness of the subsidy scheme and thereby to strengthen the market position of US agricultural
goods in export market.  For example, by raising export promotion expenditures when the export
price is high (strong dollar), and reducing the export promotion expenditure when the export price
is low (weak dollar), volatility in the domestic price would be potentially reduced, providing a welfare
gain.  In this study, we analyze the effectiveness of exchange rate-linked subsidies relative to the
current regime of unlinked subsidies to increase the welfare of US cotton producers and to strengthen
the market position of US cotton in international markets. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION
To assess the proposed policy innovation, the first step was to determine the effects of a simultaneous
increase in export promotion and exchange rate on farm prices.  Stated differently, “what would be
the exchange rate pass-through with and without export promotion?”  To answer the question posed
above, we considered the following models that describe an initial equilibrium in a competitive
industry producing homogeneous products for domestic consumption and export: 
(1) Qd = D(Pd) (Domestic demand)
(2a) Qx = D(Px, Ax)             (Ax priced in US dollars)
(2b) Qx = D(Px, Ax A Z) (Ax priced in Foreign Currency Units)
(3) Px = (Pd + T) Z              (Foreign price)
(4) Qs = S(Pd) (Domestic supply)
(5) Qs = Qd + Qx (Market clearing)6
Where Qd and Qx are quantities consumed at home and abroad, respectively; Pd is the domestic price
expressed in US dollars; Px is the export price expressed in foreign currency units; Ax is expenditures
of export promotion expressed in US dollars; Z is the exchange rate (FCU/US$); T is transportation
cost in US dollars; and Qs is domestic production.  In this model all exogenous variables affecting
supply and demand other than Ax, T, and Z are assumed to be constant and thus are suppressed.
Thus, for example, no advertising expenditure variable appears in the domestic demand relation (1)
even though in reality most  US agricultural industries promote in both domestic and export markets.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the domestic market is sufficiently integrated with world
markets so that the Law of One Price holds.  Thus, the domestic and export prices are assumed to
be identical once transportation costs and exchange rates are accounted.   Importantly, two alternative
specifications were developed for the export demand function. Specification (2a) refers to a situation
where costs for export promotion are expressed in US currency.  This specification applies when
export promotion costs are insensitive to changes in the exchange rate and  would be true if the costs
of developing and implementing the promotion campaigns are incurred mostly in the United States.
Specification (2b) refers to a situation where the costs for export promotion are expressed  in foreign
currency.  This specification holds  when export promotion costs are sensitive to the exchange rate
and/or if promotion  campaign costs are incurred primarily in the target market.
With this model, three questions were addressed:
1) How much would export promotion have to be increased to offset the effect of an X% increase
in the value of the US dollar on the domestic farm price?
2) What would be the cost of this increase to the federal treasury?
3) Would welfare gains to farmers exceed the incremental treasury outlays?7
To address these questions, we developed expressions to indicate the effect of isolated changes in A
and Z on Pd.  For this purpose, the model was first expressed in terms of the following percentage
changes:
(1') Qd* = - 0d Pd*
(2a') Qx* = - 0x Px* + $x Ax*
(2b') Qx* = - 0x Px* + $x (Ax* + Z*)
(3') Px* = R Pd* + . Z* + * T* 
(4') Qs* = , Pd*
(5') Qs* = kd Qd* + kx Qx*
where the asterisked variables indicate relative change (e.g., Pd* = dPd/Pd); 0d and 0x are domestic
and export demand elasticities expressed in absolute value; $x is the export promotion elasticity; R
=1/(1 + T/Pd) < 1 is the international price-transmission elasticity; . is the exchange-rate transmission
elasticity; * is the transportation cost elasticity; , is the farm supply elasticity; kd (= Qd/Qs) is
domestic quantity share; and kx (= Qx/Qs) is the export quantity share.  In this model we assumed  that
farm supply is upward-sloping (, > 0), promotion shifts the export demand curve to the right ($x >
0), and that domestic and export demand are downward sloping (- 0d < 0 and - 0x < 0).  (Here it is
understood that *0x*… 4, i.e., the US accounts for a sufficiently large portion of world trade that the
excess demand curve for the promoted product is not infinitely elastic.)  In addition, the “markup
model” specified in (3) implies the parametric restrictions R = . = (1 - *), which can be tested
econometrically.   8
Setting  T* = 0 since this variable was not of policy interest, the structural model (1') - (5')
yields two alternative reduced-form equations for changes in farm price as follows:
(6a)       Pd* = (kx $x/D) Ax* - ( kx 0x ./D) Z*                      (Ax priced in US dollars)
(6b)       Pd* = (kx $x/D) Ax* + [kx ($x - 0x .)/D] Z*  (Ax priced in FCU)
where D = (, + kd 0d + kx 0x R) > 0. From (6), the model implies that an isolated increase in export
promotion always increases the farm price under the stated assumptions. That is,
7) Pd*/Ax**Z* = T* = 0 = EPd, Ax = kx $x/D > 0
where EPd, Ax is the reduced-form elasticity of domestic price with respect to export promotion.  This
elasticity is directly related to the structural advertising elasticity $x, and inversely related to the
supply, demand, and price-transmission elasticities (,, 0d, 0x, and R).   
In particular, export  promotion price effects were magnified as foreign consumers become
more responsive to the promotion, and as domestic and foreign consumers and producers become
less responsive to price.  In all cases, however, the effect was positive, provided promotion was
effective, i.e., $x > 0, as assumed.  By contrast, (6) indicates that the pass-through effect is uncertain,
depending on how promotion is priced. Specifically,
(8a)          Pd*/Z* = *Ax* = T* = 0 = EPd, Z = - kx 0x ./D < 0 (Ax priced in US dollars)
(8b)          Pd*/Z*r = *Ax* = T* = 0 = EPd, Z
r = kx ($x - 0x .)/D (Ax priced in FCU)
where EPd, Z is the reduced-form elasticity of domestic price with respect to exchange rate when
export promotion is priced in US dollars, and EPd, Z
r is the corresponding elasticity when export
promotion is priced in foreign currencies.  From (8) appreciation in the value of US dollar
unambiguously decreases domestic price (negative pass-through) only if the export promotion is9
priced in US dollars.  The reason is that when promotion expenditure is priced in the foreign
currency, an increase in the value of the dollar makes export promotion less expensive.  In this
situation, revaluation has two opposing effects.  It increases export demand  due to the ability to
expand promotion expenditure, and it causes export demand to decrease due to induced increase in
export price.
Which effect dominates depends on the foreign consumers’ relative sensitivity to promotion
and price.  Specifically, if foreign consumers are relatively unresponsive to the promotion such that
$x < 0x ., then pass-through is negative; the opposite is true if foreign consumers are relatively
responsive to a promotion such that $x > 0x ..  The latter would hold, if international price linkages
are weak (. . 0), as tends to be true when US exports are subject to tariffs or other protective trade
measures (Bredahl, Meyers, and Collins,1979).  Ordinarily, however, one would expect EPd, Z
r to be
negative in sign, since promotion elasticities tend to be tiny in relation to demand elasticities.  The
overall message from (8) is that pass-through tends to be blunted when promotion is priced in the
foreign currency.   With the foregoing  relationships  in mind, question one can be answered by setting
Pd* = 0 and solving (6) for Ax* to yield:
(9a)           Ax* = EAx, Z Z*  (Ax priced in US dollars)
(9b)     Ax*r = EAx, Zr Z*  (Ax priced in FCU)
where EAx, Z = 0x ./$x > 0 is the “neutralization” elasticity that indicates the percentage increase in
export promotion expenditure required to offset the domestic price effect of a 1% currency
appreciation when the export promotion is priced in US dollars, and EAx, Zr =  EAx, Z - 1 is the
corresponding elasticity when the export promotion is priced in foreign currencies.  Thus, for
example, if 0x = 1, . = 0.90, and $x = 0.10, then EAx, Z = 9.0 and EAx, Zr = 8.0.  Under this scenario,10
to neutralize the effect of a 10% dollar appreciation (Z* = 0.10), export promotion expenditures
need   to be increased by 90% when export promotion is price in US dollars and by 80% when export
promotion is priced in a foreign currency.  
To compute the treasury cost of this increase (question 2) we need to take into account the
subsidy.  Ordinarily, the government matches industry monies on a dollar-for-dollar basis (Kinnucan
and Ackerman, 1995), which implies that approximately 50% of total promotion expenditures comes
from the federal subsidy.  Denoting this subsidy rate as H (. 0.5), the treasury cost may be defined
as follows:
(10a)             )G = EAx, Z H Ax
o Z*               (Ax priced in US dollars)
(10b)             )Gr = (EAx, Z - 1) H Ax
o Z*  (Ax priced in FCU)
where )G is the increased government outlay associated with the exchange rate-linked subsidy
scheme, and Ax
o is the initial total expenditure for export promotion.  To address question 3, we need
an industry’s “profit” function, i.e., a function that indicates the increase in domestic producer surplus
associated with the increased  promotion outlay.  Such a function can be derived by reference to
Figure 1. In this figure ES is the excess supply curve, which is constructed as the horizontal difference
between the domestic supply curve S and the domestic demand curve D.  
           The intersection of ES with the excess demand curve ED gives the initial equilibrium price
Pd
o.  At this price domestic producers supply quantity Qs
o and exports equal Qx
o, the difference
between domestic production and consumption.  An increase in expenditures for export
promotion results in an upward shift of excess demand curve to EDr.  With higher foreign
demand, US exports expand to Qxr, placing upward pressure on the domestic price owing to the11
reduced quantity in that market. With the maintained hypotheis that the law of one price holds,
the equilibrium price rises to Pdr, which encourages domestic producers to expand output to Qsr. 
The domestic producer surplus, defined as the area between the original price line Pd
o and the
supply curve S, expands by an amount equal to area PdrabPd
o.  Since this area equals the sum of a
rectangle and a triangle, its formula can be obtained using elementary math.  Specifically, the
change in domestic producer surplus ()PSd) associated with a shift in the excess demand curve
from ED to EDr is defined as follows:
                         )PSd = area of rectangle A + area of triangle B
= (Pdr - Pd
o) Qs
o + ½ (Pdr - Pd
o)(Qsr - Qs
o) 
= (Pdr - Pd
o) [Qs
o + ½ (Qsr - Qs
o)] 
= (Pdr - Pd
o) Qs
o[1 + ½ (Qsr - Qs
o)/Qs
o] 









o (1 + ½ Qs*)
where Pd* and Qs* are the relative increases in domestic price and production associated with the
demand shift. Specifically, the above equation may be written equivalently as:
)PSd = [Pd*/Ax*] Ax* Pd
o Qs
o (1 + ½ [Qs*/Ax*]Ax*)
where Pd*/Ax* is the elasticity defined in (7) and Qs*/Ax* is the corresponding elasticity with
respect to domestic production.  Noting from (4') that Qs*/Ax* = , Pd*/Ax*, the above equation
can be expressed strictly in terms of the price elasticity as follows:
)PSd = [Pd*/Ax*] Ax* Pd
o Qs
o (1 + ½ , [Pd*/Ax*]Ax*),
which, upon substitution of (7) yields:12
(11) )PSd = EPd, Ax Ax* Pd
o Qs
o (1 + ½ , EPd, Ax Ax*).
From (11), price enhancement is a necessary condition for export promotion to benefit producers,
i.e., the reduced-form elasticity EPd, Ax = kx $x/(, + kd 0d + kx 0x R) must be strictly positive. 
Equation (11) gives the producer gain for any given increase in export promotion expenditures. 
In the present analysis the actual increase in Ax is constrained by (9).  Imposing this constraint on
(11) yields gain formulas in terms of observed changes in the exchange rate as follows
(12a)  )PSd = EPd, Ax EAx, Z Z* Pd
o Qs
o (1 + ½ , EPd, Ax EAx, Z Z*)(Ax priced in US dollars)
(12b)  )PSdr = EPd, Ax EAx, Zr Z* Pd
o Qs
o (1 + ½ , EPd, Ax EAx, Zr Z*) (Ax priced in FCU).
Equation set (12) represents the gross gain to domestic producers from the ERLS scheme, i.e.,
the gain prior to subtracting the producer cost of the incremental promotion outlay.  The producer
cost of the incremental promotion outlay ()Ap) may be defined as follows:
)Ap = (1 - H) S Ax
o Ax*
where Ax
o is the initial expenditure on export promotion, i.e. the expenditure prior to the increase
associated with ERLS, and S = Z/(Z + ,) is the producer share of the promotion tax where Z =
kd 0d + kx 0x R is the “effective” demand elasticity.  In situations where the funds for promotion
are raised via per-unit levies on farm output, a portion of the levy is shifted to consumers unless
farm supply is perfectly inelastic (, = 0).  The incidence parameter S takes this “tax-shifting”
phenomenon into account. Substituting (9) into the above relationship gives the incremental
producer cost in terms of the observed change in the exchange rate as follows:
(13a) )Ap = (1 - H) S Ax
o EAx, Z Z*  (Ax priced in US dollars)
(13b) )Apr = (1 - H) S Ax
o EAx, Zr Z*  (Ax priced in FCU).13
Combining (12) and (13), the net producer gain from the linked subsidy scheme may be computed
as follows:
(14a) )NPSd = )PSd - )Ap
(14b) )NPSdr = )PSdr - )Apr
 A comparison of (10) and (14) provides a basis for determining whether a linked subsidy
would yield a net societal gain in the second-best sense.  In particular, the net “social” benefit (the
net domestic producer welfare minus treasury outlay for the subsidy) may be measured as follows:
(15a)   )SB = )NPSd - )G
(15b) )SBr = )NPSdr - )Gr.
Positive values for (15a) or (15b) would constitute evidence in favor of exchange rate-linked
subsidies for export promotion.  Negative values, on the other hand, would indicate the opposite.
3. DATA AND PARAMETER VALUES 
To analyze the issue, relevant data and information were collected from different sources
especially from the previous research and used to  assign numerical values to different model
parameters. The value for domestic price, domestic quantity, export quantity, and export share
were collected from USDA.  The baseline values of domestic demand elasticity, domestic supply
elasticity, export demand elasticity, and export promotion elasticity of US cotton were taken from
the work of Ding (1996).  Meanwhile, the baseline value of promotion expenditure in the export
market was taken from the work of Miao (2000).  In this study, the value for short run supply
elasticity was assigned as zero.  The numerical values of exchange rate and transmission price14
elasticity were calculated by using an econometric model.  The government subsidy was
calculated by dividing the total government expenditure on Cotton by  total export promotion
expenditures.  Table 1 summarizes the numerical values of all parameters collected from the
different sources. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
                    Analysis of the effectiveness of exchange rate-linked subsidies in export promotion using
available baseline parameter values for cotton yields promising results and  supports exchange
rate-linked subsidies as a more efficient way to increase the welfare of  US cotton farmers.  Study
results indicate that increased export promotion expenditure  when the value of the US dollar
appreciates and vice versa always increases US producers' surplus and strengthens  the marketing
position of US agricultural firms in international markets.  
Table 2 presents the reduced form elasticities for cotton when export promotion is
expressed in US dollar and  in foreign currencies.  All reduced form elasticities of  cotton  yield 
expected signs and are consistent with economic theories.  The results show that a 1% increase in
exchange rate requires 3.083% increase in export promotion expenditure for cotton in the short
run.  That is, an increase of 3.083% of export promotion expenditure is required to mitigate the
negative effect of a 1% increase in the exchange rate on domestic farm prices of cotton when the
export promotion is expressed in US dollars.  Similarly, offsetting negative impacts of a 1%
increase in exchange rate on farm price of cotton requires an increase in 2.083%  export
promotion expenditure in the short run, if the promotion expenditure is priced in foreign
currencies.  15
               Further, the impacts of  change in the strength of  US dollars on domestic price of 
cotton show that a 1% increase in the value of  US dollars against foreign currencies is associated
with a 0.52% reduction in US farm prices of cotton in the short run (Table 2) and a 0.58%
reduction in US farm prices of cotton in the long run when the promotion expenditure is
expressed in US Dollars.  The higher impacts of  changes in the value of  US dollars in the short
run than the long run demonstrates that impacts of exchange rate declines with time.  In the
meantime, one per cent increase in US dollar against foreign currencies causes 0.35% and 0.54%
reduction in US farm prices of cotton in the short run and long run when promotion is expressed
in foreign currencies (FCU). 
 Analysis shows that the farm prices of  cotton increase with the increase in export
promotion irrespective of  US dollars and foreign currency unit.  The effect of a 1% increase in 
promotion expenditure on farm prices was 0.17% and 0.036% for cotton in the short and long
runs, respectively (Table 2).  That is, the long-run effect of a one percent increase in export
promotion expenditure is smaller than the short-run effect  largely because of perfectly inelastic
supply elasticity in the short run. Table 3 shows the impacts of  strong a US dollar on export
promotion expenditure.  USDA reports show that the value of the US dollar increased by 16%
between 1996  and 2000.  Our study results show  that  in order to offset the negative effect of a
16% US currencies appreciation on domestic prices, short and long-run export promotion
expenditure must be increased by 49% and 257% for cotton, respectively, when the promotion
expenditure is expressed in US dollars.  An increase in  export promotion expenditures by 32%
and 240% for cotton in the short run and long run, respectively, is required to mitigate the16
impacts of  16%  increased strength of US dollar, when promotion expenditure is priced in foreign
currencies.  
The study results further reveal  that increased strength of  the US dollar  and  resultant  
increased export  promotion expenditure affects both the government and producers in the short
run. In the short run,  increased export promotion expenditure does not affect consumers because
of  perfectly inelastic supply elasticity.  However, in the long run consumers are also affected. 
Table 3 demonstrates the impacts of increased export promotion expenditures on the government,
producers, and consumers. 
In the period between 1996 and 2000, the US  federal government  contributed
approximately  50% of the total export promotion expenditure of cotton without regards to the
change in the value of US dollars.  If the changing value of  US dollar is considered (exchange
rate-linked subsidies)  government would need  to contribute an additional $26 million for cotton
in the short run, when the  export promotion expenditure is expressed in US dollars. In the
meantime,  an additional  $17 million federal support for cotton export promotion is required if
government adopted the policy of exchange rate-linked subsidies and if export promotion is
expressed in local currencies unit. 
              Expenditures for cotton export promotion are also shared by producers by using check-
off  dollars.  Under the exchange rate-linked subsidies, producers must contribute an additional 
$26 million for cotton export promotion in the short run when export promotion expenditure is
expressed in US  currencies.  However, the use of  export promotion expenditure in local
currencies requires an additional $17 million to mitigate the impacts of strengthening US dollars. 
In the short run, the producers and government bear all  incidences of these impacts, but in the17
long run, part of increased export promotion expenditure is also passed on to consumers (Table
3). That is, consumers bear $56 million of the increased export promotion expenditures of cotton.
              The impacts of increased  export promotion expenditures for the federal government,
producers, and consumers and  the social benefit of an exchange rate-linked policy on export
promotion are shown in Table 4.  Increased  producer surplus minus increased  government and
producers expenditure  to cover  the additional cost of  cotton export promotion expenditure
reflect the total impacts of  exchange rate-linked subsidies. Study results show that an increase in
promotion expenditure due to the increase in dollar exchange rate increases producer welfare. In
our analysis, the gross gain to domestic producers from the exchange rate-linked subsidy scheme
was positive and  greatly exceeded the increased total cost of export promotion  expenditure
contributed by producers and the federal government.  Under an exchange rate-linked subsidies
scheme, the net social welfare gains were $1,716 million and $ 1,759 million in the short and long
runs, respectively, for cotton when export promotion is expressed in US dollars.  Similarly, total
social gains were $1,161 million and $1,648 million in the short and long runs, respectively,  when 
cotton export promotion expenditure is expressed in foreign currencies.
In our analysis, short-run marginal returns under exchange rate-linked subsidies were $66
and $68 for cotton when the export promotions are expressed in US dollar and local currencies,
respectively.  However, in the long run, the marginal return under exchange rate-linked export
promotion program was $23 irrespective of US dollar or local currencies.  These results exhibit
diminishing impacts of the export promotion program and an indifference between the impacts of
US dollar and local currencies unit in the long run.18
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In our analysis of differential promotional expenditures linked to exchange rates, an increased export
promotion expenditure was induced by  increased strength of  US currencies, showing a positive
impact and significant producers gain to the US cotton producers.  The  return of  the last dollar
invested on the export promotion program tended  to be higher in the short run than in the long run.
The export promotion expenditure associated with the foreign currencies and  US dollars did not
demonstrated a crucial difference in terms of the returns and the incremental costs.  The law of
incidence holds for consumers in the short run, because of perfectly inelastic supply assumptions but
a portion of the export promotion costs is shifted to consumers in the long run.  The results of the
study clearly support the concept of exchange rate-linked subsidies for export promotion of cotton
relative to the classical subsidy scheme for export promotion programs .  Study results suggest that
producers and government consider the changing value of  US dollars to increase the  effectiveness
of export promotion program and thereby the welfare of US cotton producers. 19
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Table 1. Model Parameters and Baseline Values, US Cotton Industry, 5 Years Cumulative, 1996-2000
Item Definition Value
Pd Domestic price ($/mt.) 
a 1306
Qs Total production (millions mt.) 
b  16
Pd.Qs Industry Revenue (millions $) 20896
Qd Domestic consumption (Millions mt.) 10
Qx Export quantity (Millions mt.) 6
Atp US foreign third party outlet for export promotion 27
AI US industry outlays for export promotion ($ mil.)  24.5
Ag Government outlays for export promotion ($ mil.) 53









Proportion of cotton exports in Japan (Qj/Qx) 0.053
6k
Proportion of cotton exports in Korea(Qk /Qx) 0.073
6t
Proportion of cotton exports in Turkey (Qt /Qx) 0.084
6i
Proportion of cotton exports in Indonesia (Qk /Qx) 0.088
6m
Proportion of cotton exports in Mexico(Qm/Qx)0 . 2 4
6c Proportion of cotton exports in China(Qm/Qx) 0.041
6c Proportion of cotton exports in Canada (Qm/Qx) 0.043
6t Proportion of cotton exports in Taiwan (Qm/Qx) 0.056
6t Proportion of cotton exports in Thailand (Qm/Qx) 0.035
H Subsidy rate (Ag/Ax)0 . 5 0
$x Export promotion elasticity 0.12, 0.066
R Transmission price elasticity 0.21, 0.27
. Exchange rate elasticity 0.24, 0.36
, Domestic supply elasticity 0, 0.30
0d
Domestic demand elasticity in absolute value 0.30
0x
Export demand elasticity in absolute value 1.00, 2.00
Z Effective demand elasticity (kd nd + kx nx R) 0.27, 0.69
S Producer incidence {Z/(Z +,)} 1 or 0.57,
a Prices data refer to average value for the 1996-2000 crop years. Source: FAS/USDA 2001.
b Production, export and domestic consumption data refers to total values for the year 1996-2000 marketing years as
reported in FAS/USDA (table 11).
c Total outlays for export promotion of 1996 multiplied by 5 years
d Total values for 1996-2000.22
Table 2.  Reduced Form Elasticities 
Elasticity Short Run Long Run
Ax in US dollars
EPd,Ax   0.172 0.036
EPd,Z -0.52 -0.58





Table 3.  Increase in Export Promotion Expenditures Required to Neutralize the Effect on the US
Cotton Price of a 16% Appreciation in the US Dollar, 1996-2000.
Item Scenario 1 Scenario 2
SR LR SR LR
1. Increase in Total Expenditures (%) 49 257 32 240
2. Increase in Total Expenditures (mil. $) 52 267 34 250
3. Government share (G), mil. $  26 134 17 125
4. Industry share (Ap), mil $ 26 77 17 72
5. Consumer share (Item 2 - 3 - 4), mil. $ 0 56 0 52
Note: Scenario 1 assumes export promotion expenditures are priced in US dollars: scenario 2 assumes the expenditures
are priced in foreign currencies
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Table 4.  Net Social Benefit of an Exchange-Rate Linked Export Promotion Policy as Applied to US
Cotton, 1996-2000
a 
SR LR SR LR
1. Change in producer surplus, mil. $ 1768 1970 1195 1846
2. Increased industry outlays for promotion, mil. $ 26 77 17 72
3. Net increase in producer surplus (item 1 - 2)  1742 1893 1178 1774
4. Government outlays for promotion, mil $ 26 134 17 126
5) Net social benefit        (item 3-4)  1716 1759 1161 1648
a Based on percent increases in promotion expenditures indicated in table 3. See that table for scenario definitions
              Panel A: Domestic Market                  Panel B: Export Market
Figure 1. Effect of Export Promotion on Domestic Producer Surplus for Large Exporter